Dialectica 54 (3):177-99 (2000)
|Abstract||Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as.|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Pain Semantics Sensation Term Wittgenstein|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
G. E. M. Anscombe (1974). The Subjectivity of Sensation. Ajatus 36:3-18.
Moreland Perkins (1970). Matter, Sensation, and Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):1-12.
S. Dumpleton (1988). Sensation and Function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):376-89.
Sonia Sedivy (2004). Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Empiricism's Third Dogma: Why Perception is Not an Amalgam of Sensation and Conceptualization. Philosophical Investigations 27 (1):1-33.
Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.
William S. Robinson (2006). What is It Like to Like? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.
David Robjant (2012). Learning of Pains; Wittgenstein's Own Cartesian Mistake at Investigations 246. Wittgenstein Studien 2012 3 (2012):261-285.
Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
Charles E. M. Dunlop (1984). Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
James W. Cornman (1968). Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism. Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #36,464 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,222 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?