Sensation terms

Dialectica 54 (3):177-99 (2000)
Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as.
Keywords Metaphysics  Pain  Semantics  Sensation  Term  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2000.tb00200.x
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kathrin Glüer (2012). Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):292-300.

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