David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 20 (2):191-197 (2005)
In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker essentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag 18--105.
David Liggins (2005). Truthmakers and Explanation. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon 105--115.
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
D. M. Armstrong (2000). Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking. The Monist 83 (1):150-160.
Markku Keinänen (2008). Armstrong's Conception of Supervenience. In Tim de Mey & Markku Keinänen (eds.), Problems From Armstrong. Acta Philosophica Fennica 84 51.
Frank Hofmann (2006). Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440.
Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.
Joan Pagès (2005). Truthmaking and Supervenience. Theoria 20 (2):191-197.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #198,834 of 1,777,884 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #123,860 of 1,777,884 )
How can I increase my downloads?