David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478 (2007)
Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic.
|Keywords||Philosophy Computational Linguistics Mathematical Logic and Foundations Logic|
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Michael Dummett (2001). Victor's Error. Analysis 61 (1):1–2.
Frederic B. Fitch (1963). A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts. Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
J. van Benthem (2004). What One May Come to Know. Analysis 64 (2):95-105.
Timothy Williamson (1982). Intuitionism Disproved? Analysis 42 (4):203--7.
Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
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