On qualia, relations, and structure in color experience
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985 (1999)
| Abstract | In this Response, I defend the notion of intrinsic qualities of experience, discuss the distinction between relational experience and relational structure, clarify the difference between narrow and broad interpretations of color experience, argue against externalist approaches to color experience, defend the concept of isomorphism as a limitation in understanding color experiences, examine critiques of the color machine and color room arguments, and counter objections to within-subject experiments based on memory limitations. | |||||||||
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