David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272 (2011)
According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 228-247, 2005). Pereboom's case, a variant of what are known as Trankfurt cases,' is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom's example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples
|Keywords||Ethics Metaphysics Moral responsibility Free will Frankfurt Pereboom|
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References found in this work BETA
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Carl Ginet (1996). In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
Carl Ginet (2002). Book Review. Living Without Free Will. Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
David Hunt & Seth Shabo (2013). Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
Justin A. CApes (2013). Mitigating Soft Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
Derk Pereboom (2012). Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
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