David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272 (2011)
According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 228-247, 2005). Pereboom's case, a variant of what are known as Trankfurt cases,' is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom's example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples
|Keywords||Ethics Metaphysics Moral responsibility Free will Frankfurt Pereboom|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
Citations of this work BETA
Seth Shabo (forthcoming). Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise. Acta Analytica:1-18.
David Hunt & Seth Shabo (2013). Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
Derk Pereboom (2012). Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
Justin A. CApes (2013). Mitigating Soft Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
Similar books and articles
Michael Robinson (2012). Modified Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.
John Davenport (2006). The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining From Deciding: A Response to McKenna and Pereboom. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (4):62 - 88.
Derk Pereboom (2009). Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Kevin Timpe (2006). A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism. Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.
David P. Hunt (1996). Frankfurt Counterexamples. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
Eric Funkhouser (2009). Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
David Hunt (1996). ``Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker--Fischer Debate&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
Added to index2009-12-16
Total downloads148 ( #12,612 of 1,725,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #210,647 of 1,725,860 )
How can I increase my downloads?