Inquiry 10 (1-4):268-278 (1967)
Is it possible for me to believe what I know not to be the case? It certainly does not seem possible for me, at the same time, to be aware of the fact that a given proposition is true and yet believe that the proposition is false. Models of self?deception which have the implication that this is possible are usually described as ?paradoxical?. However, many philosophers believe that there are genuine cases of self?deception which non?paradoxical models of self?deception mirror and elucidate. In the present article the author considers what he takes to be the leading contenders among non?paradoxical (or seemingly non?paradoxical) models of self?deception. He concludes from his analysis that it is not clear that any of these models mirror actual cases of self?deception and that it is not even obvious that there are actual cases of self?deception to be mirrored
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Self-deception
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DOI 10.1080/00201746708601493
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References found in this work BETA
Raphael Demos (1960). Lying to Oneself. Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595.
Frederick A. Siegler (1962). Demos on Lying to Oneself. Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):469-474.
Frederick A. Siegler (1963). Self-Deception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):29-43.

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Citations of this work BETA
Herbert Fingarette (1998). Self-Deception Needs No Explaining. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.

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