David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophers' Imprint 11 (16) (2011)
There is a strong moral presumption against the use of coercion, and those who are coerced seem to be less responsible for the actions they were coerced to perform. Both these considerations seem to reflect the effect of coercion on the victim’s choice. This paper examines three ways of understanding this effect. First, I argue against understanding victims as unable to engage in genuine action. Next, I consider the suggestion that victims are unable to consent to participate in the coercer’s plan. Although this suggestion is promising, I argue that the inability to consent reflects a more basic problem. Victims are unable to exercise what I call ‘normative authority’: they are unable to make discretionary changes in the permissions and obligations that they and others have. This final account yields a compelling understanding of why coercion is impermissible when it is and reveals a unique way in which impermissible coercion affects the responsibility of victims
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin Sachs (2013). Why Coercion is Wrong When It's Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):63 - 82.
Similar books and articles
Elinor Mason (2012). Coercion and Integrity. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2. Oxford.
Joseph Millum (2014). Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):113-127.
Joan McGregor (1988). Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market. Philosophy Research Archives 14:23-50.
Jan-Willem van der Rijt (2011). Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):549-567.
Benjamin McMyler (2011). Doxastic Coercion. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):537-557.
Russell Hardin (1990). Rationally Justifying Political Coercion. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:79-91.
Martin Gunderson (1979). Threats and Coercion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):247 - 259.
Stephen D. Mallary, Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver (1986). Family Coercion and Valid Consent. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 7 (2).
Mark Leon (2011). Reason and Coercion: In Defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom. Philosophia 39 (4):733-740.
Joan McGregor (1988). PhilipS on Coerced Agreements. Law and Philosophy 7 (2):225 - 236.
Fabienne Peter (2004). Choice, Consent, and the Legitimacy of Market Transactions. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
David Owens (2011). The Possibility of Consent. Ratio 24 (4):402-421.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads67 ( #20,927 of 1,098,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #42,748 of 1,098,129 )
How can I increase my downloads?