Ockham and Buridan on Epistemic Sentences: Appellation of the Form and Appellation of Reason

Vivarium 50 (2):139-160 (2012)
Buridan’s theory of sentences with epistemic verbs (‘to know’, ‘to believe’, etc.) has received much attention in recent scholarship. Its originality with respect to Ockham’s approach, however, has been importantly overestimated. The present paper argues that both doctrines share crucial features and basically belong to the same family. This is done by comparing Buridan’s notion of the ‘appellation of reason’ with Ockham’s application to epistemic sentences of the general principle that a predicate always ‘appellates its form’
Keywords John Buridan   Appellation of reason   William of Ockham   Epistemic sentences   Appellation of the form   Nominalism
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DOI 10.1163/156853412X631906
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Peter King (1987). Jean Buridan's Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (2):109-132.

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