Online research in philosophy

Abstract This overview describes the relatively brief, but nevertheless rich and provocative history of human rights education in Latin America. It links this history with relevant political histories, cultural phenomena and social movements. The basic perspective is derived from Chilean experiences, but then branches out into a variety of related endeavours in other countries. The occurrence of human rights violations is seen as the basic initial stimulus for human rights education.

In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and autonomy that some individuals can exercise. Since we are in no position to rule out that non-humans can exercise these capacities, I conclude that rights should not be reserved to humans. This will lead to a reformulation of the reasons why so-called ‘marginal’ humans and non-human animals can be granted some basic rights. Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for holding rights. All individuals, human or non-human, who can exercise reason and autonomy to some extent can be accorded basic rights in virtue of their having morally relevant preferences.

The Challenge of Human Rights traces the history of human rights theory from classical antiquity through the enlightenment to the modern human rights movement, and analyses the significance of human rights in today’s increasingly globalized world. Provides an engaging study of the origin and the philosophical and political development of human rights discourse. Offers an original defence of human rights. Explores the significance of human rights in the context of increasing globalisation. Confronts the major objections to human rights, including the charge of western ethical imperialism and cultural relativism. Argues that human rights logically culminate in an ethical cosmopolitanism to reflect the moral unity of the human race.

Abstract Human rights education is an essential part of preparation for participation in a pluralistic democracy. As Europe aspires to be a continent of democratic states accepting human rights as their basic principles, a human rights ethic should be a feature of all schools within Europe. Human rights education provides an ethical and moral framework for living in community. Moreover, this ethical position is backed in Europe by the powerful legal framework of the European Convention on Human Rights. This paper describes the features of two teachers? human rights education courses based on a structure proposed by Richardson. Both explore the relationship between moral and legal aspects of human rights teaching. The Council of Europe Recommendation on ?Teaching and Learning about Human Rights in Schools? identifies three broad dimensions of human rights education, namely: skills, knowledge and feelings. The latter affective dimension, as well as facts and pedagogy, is critical to successful teacher education in human rights.

John Rawls produced two versions of the law of peoples: an article, published in 1993, and a book, published in 1999. Both versions defend basic human rights as a minimum requirement of a just law of peoples. However, in an apparent effort to strengthen his defense of this requirement, the argument changed. This paper examines the apparent difficulties that forced the changes and maintains that they still do not succeed in justifying basic human rights. The source of the difficulty, I argue, is Rawls’s reluctance to impose liberal values on nonliberal societies, and the imposition of such values, I suggest, is unavoidable if basic human rights are to be justified. Hence, if our best attempts to justify basic human rights ultimately show that appeals to liberal values are unavoidable, then we should regard such appeals as no more of an imposition than the expectation that all societies must protect basic human rights. Even more significantly, if such appeals justify liberal freedoms that go beyond basic human rights, then arguments in support of basic human rights would also justify international efforts to advance further liberal reforms within nonliberal societies.

Abstract: Many people have lamented the proliferation of human rights claims. The cure for this problem, it may be thought, would be to develop a theory that can distinguish ‘real’ from ‘supposed’ human rights. I argue, however, that the proliferation of human rights mirrors a deep problem in human rights theory itself. Contemporary theories of natural rights to welfare are historical descendants from a theory of rights to subsistence which was developed in twelfth-century Europe. According to this theory, each human being has a special role to fulfil in God's plan and therefore has inalienable rights to subsist. Later theories have secularized this idea by claiming that human beings are purposive agents. Secularization, however, comes at a price. In the case of these theories, the price is a failure to provide satisfactory answers to the most basic questions we would expect of a theory of natural rights to answer. They have failed to provide a basis for ascribing these rights to all and only to human beings. They have not been able to generate a clear and viable criterion for ascribing duties correlative to these rights. And they cannot limit rights-claims in a non-arbitrary way. Hence we should abandon these theories.

The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for weak paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights -- Clarifications and responses to objections -- Conclusion.

In a series of reports the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations has emphasized a tripartite framework regarding business and human rights that includes the state “duty to protect,” the TNC “responsibility to respect,” and “appropriate remedies” for human rights violations. This article examines the recent history of UN initiatives regarding business and human rights and places the tripartite framework in historical context. Three approaches to human rights are distinguished: moral, political, and legal. It is argued that the tripartite framework’s grounding of the responsibility of TNCs to respect human rights is properly understood as moral and not merely as a political or legal duty. A moral account of the duty of TNCs to respect basic human rights is defended and contrasted with a merely strategic approach. The main conclusion of the article is that only a moral account of the basic human rights duties of TNCs provides a sufficiently deep justification of “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights” feature of the tripartite framework.

Abstract Religious education refers to basic, sacred texts. Education also has basic, secular texts. ?Back to basics? should include basic values which are found in human rights instruments. Human rights are sometimes erroneously referred to as a Western and Northern values system, but the article notes an Islamic tradition of acknowledging human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 ushered in a multiplicity of human rights texts that are international and which educators can confidently use as standards in any circumstances. In schools in which linguistic, cultural, religious and ethnic pluralism is a fact of life, these principles are helpful guidelines for conduct and policy. All major human rights texts start with a reaffirmation of a commitment to equality of rights and equality of dignity. Programmes to develop race or gender equality and to enhance opportunities for those with special needs and disabilities are essentially concerned with human rights.

Basic rights are often of great instrumental value in securing protection for important human needs and interests. The first two sections of this paper defend the thesis that basic rights are also valuable independently of their instrumental role. Taking my cue from Frances Kamm's suggestion that basic rights reflect or express human worth, in the third, fourth and fifth sections I develop the proposal that the non-instrumental value of basic rights derives from their constitutive role in a universal form of community or fellowship. The importance of basic rights' instrumental role is reaffi rmed in the final section of the paper, which builds on the earlier sections to offer a 'mixed' theory according to which basic rights have both instrumental and non-instrumental value.