Harvard 1940–1941: Tarski, Carnap and Quine on a finitistic language of mathematics for science

History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):327-357 (2005)
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Abstract

Tarski, Carnap and Quine spent the academic year 1940?1941 together at Harvard. In their autobiographies, both Carnap and Quine highlight the importance of the conversations that took place among them during the year. These conversations centred around semantical issues related to the analytic/synthetic distinction and on the project of a finitist/nominalist construction of mathematics and science. Carnap's Nachlaß in Pittsburgh contains a set of detailed notes, amounting to more than 80 typescripted pages, taken by Carnap while these discussions were taking place. In my article, I present a survey of these notes with special emphasis on Tarski's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the passage from typed languages to first-order languages, Tarski's finitism/nominalism, and the construction of a finitist language for mathematics and science

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Paolo Mancosu
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
Vienna circle.Thomas Uebel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
‘‘Quine’s Evolution from ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.

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References found in this work

Testability and Meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 2011 - Literary Licensing, LLC.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
What are logical notions?Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
Introduction to Semantics.Rudolf Carnap - 1942 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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