Harvard 1940–1941: Tarski, Carnap and Quine on a finitistic language of mathematics for science

History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):327-357 (2005)
Tarski, Carnap and Quine spent the academic year 1940?1941 together at Harvard. In their autobiographies, both Carnap and Quine highlight the importance of the conversations that took place among them during the year. These conversations centred around semantical issues related to the analytic/synthetic distinction and on the project of a finitist/nominalist construction of mathematics and science. Carnap's Nachlaß in Pittsburgh contains a set of detailed notes, amounting to more than 80 typescripted pages, taken by Carnap while these discussions were taking place. In my article, I present a survey of these notes with special emphasis on Tarski's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the passage from typed languages to first-order languages, Tarski's finitism/nominalism, and the construction of a finitist language for mathematics and science
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DOI 10.1080/01445340500141586
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski (1986). What Are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.

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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
Gary Ebbs (2014). Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.

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