David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):531-548 (2003)
In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L'* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L'* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case
|Keywords||deviant logics logical pluralism paraconsistent logics proof-theoretic semantics Quine substructural logics|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1986). Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1974). The Roots of Reference. Lasalle, Ill.,Open Court.
Citations of this work BETA
Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2013). Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
Francesco Paoli (2007). Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):553 – 579.
Patrick Allo (2007). Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
Patrick Allo (2014). Synonymy and Intra-Theoretical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):77-91.
Eduardo Barrio, Lucas Rosenblatt & Diego Tajer (2015). The Logics of Strict-Tolerant Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):551-571.
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