David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This paper aims at demonstrating that the cognitive mechanisms underlying certain tropes (e.g. metaphor or metonymy) may assume variable degrees of conventionalisation, thereby giving rise to a range of phenomena along either side of the semantics/ pragmatics distinction. Examining specifically cases of metonymy, I propose a pragmatic account of creative, one-off metonymic expressions using the framework of relevance theory; my main argument is that metonymy is a variety of the interpretive use of language. I further look at degrees of conventionalisation that a given metonymy may go through until it becomes fully semanticised, thus bringing about semantic change. My discussion should have farreaching implications for lexical semantics and the relevance-theoretic distinction between descriptive and interpretive use.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Patrick Hawley (2002). What is Said. Journal of Pragmatics 34 (8):969-991.
Frederic Goubier & Nausicaa Pouscoulous (2011). Virtus Sermonis and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Vivarium 49 (1-3):214-239.
Robyn Carston (2008). Linguistic Communication and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 165 (3):321 - 345.
Robyn Carston (1999). The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction: A View From Relevance Theory. In Ken Turner (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface From Different Points of View. Elsevier. 85125.
Charles Sayward (1974). The Received Distinction Between Pragmatics, Syntax and Semantics. Foundations of Language 11:97-104.
Kent Bach (1999). The Semantics Pragmatics Distinction: What It is and Why It Matters. In K. Turner (ed.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface From Different Points of View. Elsevier. 65--84.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #52,616 of 1,089,047 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )
How can I increase my downloads?