Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494 (2007)
Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00133.x
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze. Oxford University Press.

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David Papineau (2009). The Poverty of Analysis. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.

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