Must a physicalist be a microphysicalist?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press (2008)
I take myself to be a physicalist. I hold that all facts, including such prima facie non-physical facts as mental and biological facts, metaphysically supervene on the physical facts. However, I do not have any views about the relationship between macroscopic and microscopic facts. I am neutral on such questions as whether big things are always made of small things. Recently I have become worried about this combination of views. This is because many other philosophers seem to think of physicalism as some kind of commitment to the primacy of the microscopic. In their view, physicalism doesn’t just say that everything is physical. It also says that everything is microscopically determined. Here are some representative quotations
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