Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1):69-82 (1998)
|Abstract||Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire to think well of themselves. She concludes that the desire to think well of oneself causes the ideological beliefs. The article defends the adaptational account from Meyerson's attempt to ground it in the psychology of the rulers. Meyerson is wrong both in thinking that the desire in question is explanatorily necessary and in thinking that its explanatory role would consist in its causing ideological beliefs.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Imants Baruss (2008). Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality: Clarification of the Confusion Concerning Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):277-292.
Matthew Van Cleave (2010). Linguistic Practice and False-Belief Tasks. Mind & Language 25 (3):298-328.
Mitchell Herschbach (2008). False-Belief Understanding and the Phenomenological Critics of Folk Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.
Alan Sica (1995). Gabel's "Micro/Macro" Bridge: The Schizophrenic Process Writ Large. Sociological Theory 13 (1):66-99.
Christopher G. Framarin (2008). Unselfishness. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):69-83.
Jonathan Ichikawa (2008). Skepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.
Denise Meyerson (1991). False Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #99,484 of 549,069 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )
How can I increase my downloads?