Metaphysics over Methodology--Or, Why Infidelity Provides No Grounds To Divorce Causes from Probabilities
|Abstract||A reduction of causation to probabilities would be a great achievement, if it were possible. Â In this paper I want to defend this reductionist ambition against some recent criticisms from Gurol Irzik (1996) and Dan Hausman (1998).Â In particular, I want to show that the reductionist programme can be absolved of a vice which is widely thought to disable it--the vice of infidelity|
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