David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In this paper I argue against previous approaches to the semantics of generics which involved the notions of prototype, stereotype and relevant quantification. I assume that the logical form of generics includes a generic operator which, as Heim (1992) has suggested, can be construed as the modal operator of necessity. After demonstrating that the presence of the generic operator in a semantic representation, as well as its domain of quantification, are pragmatically supplied, I go on to show how the various interpretations generics may receive can be successfully accounted for within a relevance-theoretic framework.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrei Cimpian & Ellen M. Markman (2008). Preschool Children’s Use of Cues to Generic Meaning. Cognition 107 (1):19-53.
Similar books and articles
Bernard Nickel (2008). Generics and the Ways of Normality. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6):629-648.
Ariel Cohen (2004). Generics and Mental Representations. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (5):529-556.
Sarah-Jane Leslie (2008). Generics: Cognition and Acquisition. Philosophical Review 117 (1):1-47.
Kathrin Koslicki (1999). Genericity and Logical Form. Mind and Language 14 (4):441–467.
Bernhard Nickel (2010). Generically Free Choice. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (6):479-512.
Ariel Cohen (1999). Generics, Frequency Adverbs, and Probability. Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (3):221-253.
Ariel Cohen (2004). Existential Generics. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (2):137-168.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #92,102 of 1,725,598 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #167,236 of 1,725,598 )
How can I increase my downloads?