Representation and explanation

Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72 (1984)
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the cognitive mechanism's parts
Keywords Belief  Cognitive  Functionalism  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289205
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Thomas Raleigh (2013). Phenomenology Without Representation. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):1209-1237.

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