David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72 (1984)
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the cognitive mechanism's parts
|Keywords||Belief Cognitive Functionalism Science|
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Neil Sinclair (2012). Metaethics, Teleosemantics and the Function of Moral Judgements. Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.
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Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Evolution, Teleology, Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):89-391.
Jonathan Bennett (1993). Comments on Dennett From a Cautious Ally. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.
Peter Schulte (2012). How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test. Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.
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