Reply to Kirk and Melnyk

I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my discussion of the anti-materialist 'intuition of distinctness', raising questions about my attempt to explain this intuition away, and offering alternative suggestions of his own
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Andrew Melnyk (1998). The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.
Robert Francescotti (2010). Realization and Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):601-616.
Robert Kirk (2001). Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

116 ( #19,177 of 1,724,852 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

41 ( #28,421 of 1,724,852 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.