Some conclusive reasons against 'conclusive reasons'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):72 – 76 (1973)
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DOI 10.1080/00048407312341061
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Skyrms (1967). The Explication of "X Knows That P". Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
William S. Boardman (1978). Conclusive Reasons and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):32 – 40.

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