Salmon, Statistics, and Backwards Causation

Abstract
In order to explain why falling barometers don't cause rain, a "no-eclipsing" requirement needs to be added to the regularity account of causation. This refinement of the regularity account allows us to see how conclusions about deterministic causes can be based on statistical premises, and thus indicates a criticism of Wesley Salmon's "statistical relevance" account of causation. The refinement also casts some light on the problem of backwards causation.
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