David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kantian Review 12 (2):128-146 (2007)
In his later moral writings Kant claims that we have a duty to cultivate certain aspects of our sensuous nature. This claim is surprising for three reasons. First, given Kant’s ‘incorporation thesis’ − which states that the only sensible states capable of determining our actions are those that we willingly introduce and integrate into our maxims − it would seem that the content of our inclinations is morally irrelevant. Second, the exclusivity between the passivity that is characteristic of sensibility and the spontaneous quality of our free will that operates throughout Kant’s philosophy seems to preclude that any such cultivation is possible. Third, Kant’s specific arguments concerning why we are obliged to cultivate our sensible nature are unclear. The goal of this paper is to address each of these three concerns and thus fully explain Kant’s theory of the moral necessity of cultivation.
|Keywords||Kant Sensibility Moral Psychology|
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References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (2006). Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View. Cambridge University Press.
Henry E. Allison (1990). Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
Paul Guyer (2000). Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge University Press.
Marcia Baron (1995). Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Cornell University Press.
Paul Guyer (1993). Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alix Cohen (2015). The Role of Feelings in Kant's Account of Moral Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (1):n/a-n/a.
Ido Geiger (2011). Rational Feelings and Moral Agency. Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
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