David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Human Studies 27 (3):307-334 (2004)
Rawls''s recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls''s comments on the division of a cake.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Matteo Bonotti (2011). Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism. Res Publica 17 (2):107-123.
Alan Carter (2006). Political Liberalism and Political Compliance: Part 2 of the Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls’s Theories of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):135-157.
Robert B. Talisse (2003). Rawls on Pluralism and Stability. Critical Review 15 (1-2):173-194.
Ali Rizvi (2012). Testing the Limits of Liberalism: A Reverse Conjecture. Heythrop Journal 53 (3):382-404.
F. Freyenhagen (2011). Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):323-342.
João Cardoso Rosas (2006). Justice and Restrain. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 2:153-157.
Robert B. Talisse (2008). Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 106-128.
Sean Johnston (2010). Conceptions of the Good and the Ubiquity of Power. Social Philosophy Today 26:83-90.
Percy B. Lehning (1998). The Coherence of Rawls's Plea for Democratic Equality. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):1-41.
Ruth Abbey (2007). Back Toward a Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families. Political Theory 35 (1):5 - 28.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #81,233 of 1,096,548 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #23,815 of 1,096,548 )
How can I increase my downloads?