Human Studies 27 (3):307-334 (2004)
|Abstract||Rawls''s recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls''s comments on the division of a cake.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Matteo Bonotti (2011). Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism. Res Publica 17 (2):107-123.
Percy B. Lehning (1998). The Coherence of Rawls's Plea for Democratic Equality. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):1-41.
Sean Johnston (2010). Conceptions of the Good and the Ubiquity of Power. Social Philosophy Today 26:83-90.
Robert B. Talisse (2008). Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 106-128.
João Cardoso Rosas (2006). Justice and Restrain. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 2:153-157.
F. Freyenhagen (2011). Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):323-342.
Ali Rizvi (2012). Testing the Limits of Liberalism: A Reverse Conjecture. Heythrop Journal 53 (3):382-404.
Robert B. Talisse (2003). Rawls on Pluralism and Stability. Critical Review 15 (1-2):173-194.
Alan Carter (2006). Political Liberalism and Political Compliance: Part 2 of the Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls’s Theories of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):135-157.
Ruth Abbey (2007). Back Toward a Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families. Political Theory 35 (1):5 - 28.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #101,164 of 722,871 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,871 )
How can I increase my downloads?