The presumption of movement

Axiomathes 17 (2):137-154 (2007)
Abstract
The conceptualisation of movement has always been problematical for Western thought, ever since Parmenides declared our incapacity to conceptualise the plurality of change because our self-identical thought can only know an identical being. Exploiting this peculiar feature and constraint on our thought, Zeno of Elea devised his famous paradoxes of movement in which he shows that the passage from a position to movement cannot be conceptualised. In this paper, I argue that this same constraint is at the root of our incapacity to conceptualise the unseen movement at the micro-level and that the aporetic idea of super-position far from opening the gate on a deeper reality is a symptomatic word for this lack of understanding.
Keywords Zeno  Movement  Reality  Parmenides  Causality  Quantum reality  EPR  Einstein Podolsky Rosen  Quantum physics  Zeno’s paradoxes
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References found in this work BETA
A. A. Long & L. Taran (1966). Parmenides. Journal of Hellenic Studies 86:223.

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