Axiological actualism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):137 – 147 (2002)
| Abstract | This intuition may be contrasted with the incompatible intuitions that might support, say, average utilitarianism. According to average utilitarianism we should bring about that outcome which has the highest average utility. That someone would have a higher than average level of utility is, therefore, ceteris paribus a reason to act so that that person exists. Because of this, the basic intuition is a reason for rejecting average utilitarianism | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesSamir Okasha (2009). Individuals, Groups, Fitness and Utility: Multi-Level Selection Meets Social Choice Theory. Biology and Philosophy 24 (5):561-584.
Peter Vallentyne (1993). Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.
James Beebe (2010). Moral Relativism in Context. Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
Theodore Sider (1991). Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value? Analysis 51 (4):265 - 271.
Mark Walker (2007). Superlongevity and Utilitarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):581 – 595.
James L. Hudson (1987). The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People. Philosophical Studies 51 (1):123 - 137.
Paul Sludds (2003). The Importance of Being Actual: Some Reasons for and Against Procreation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):561 – 568.
Thomas L. Carson (1983). Utilitarianism and the Wrongness of Killing. Erkenntnis 20 (1):49 - 60.
Dale E. Miller (2003). Axiological Actualism and the Converse Intuition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123 – 125.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads9 ( #113,901 of 548,951 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,951 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
