Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann

Dialectica 67 (3):353-358 (2013)
Abstract
The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision
Keywords Quine  Infallibilism and Fallibilism  A Priori Knowledge  Self-Knowledge  Burge  Compositionality  Belief Revision and Revisability
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