Belief and pathology of self-awareness: A phenomenological contribution to the classification of delusions
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161 (2004)
Delusions are usually defined as false beliefs about the state of affairs in the public world. Taking this premise as unquestionable, the debate in cognitive science tends to oscillate between the so-called 'rationalist approach'- proposing some breakdown in the central intellective modules embodying human rationality - and the 'empiricist approach' - proposing a primary peripheral deficit , followed by explanatory efforts in the form of delusions. In this article the foundational assumption about delusion is questioned. Especially in the case of schizophrenia, delusions are not epistemic statements about external world but metaphorical reports of altered structure of experiencing . Delusions as epistemic statements or beliefs occur paradigmatically in delusional disorder . These two types of delusions are compared from a primarily phenomenological stance
|Keywords||Belief Delusion Metaphysics Pathology Self-awareness|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2014). When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
Josef Parnas & Mads Gram Henriksen (2016). Mysticism and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Structure of Consciousness in the Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders. Consciousness and Cognition 43:75-88.
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