David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Foundations of Science 16 (1):21-30 (2011)
Putnam (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with each other are approximately true, and that their key terms refer. My position is immune to Laudan’s counterexamples to Putnam’s inference and yields a solution to a problem with Kitcher’s position
|Keywords||Coherence Kitcher Laudan Putnam Success Scientific Realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Stephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens (2003). Solving the Riddle of Coherence. Mind 112 (448):601-634.
Carl G. Hempel (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Robin Findlay Hendry (2001). Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S25-.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Martin Carrier (2014). Prediction in Context: On the Comparative Epistemic Merit of Predictive Success. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):97-102.
Similar books and articles
Clyde L. Hardin & Alexander Rosenberg (1982). In Defense of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615.
Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
Antonio Diéguez-Lucena (2006). Why Does Laudan's Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):393 - 403.
Jacob Busch (2008). No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks. Theoria 74 (2):102-114.
Peter J. Lewis (2001). Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy. Synthese 129 (3):371--380.
Ludwig Fahrbach (2011). Theory Change and Degrees of Success. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1283-1292.
Gerald Doppelt (2007). Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
James W. McAllister (1993). Scientific Realism and the Criteria for Theory-Choice. Erkenntnis 38 (2):203 - 222.
Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Gerald Doppelt (2013). Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists. Topoi 32 (1):43-51.
Added to index2010-11-18
Total downloads231 ( #3,633 of 1,700,244 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #41,170 of 1,700,244 )
How can I increase my downloads?