Externalism and Self-Knowledge

In Ed Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013)
Entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of the literature on whether externalism about thought content precludes non-empirical knowledge of one's own thoughts.
Keywords Content Externalism  Self-Knowledge  A Priori  Introspection  Skepticism  Semantic Externalism  Psychological Externalism  Burge, Tyler  Boghossian, Paul  Brueckner, Anthony
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