Fixing Frege

Journal of Philosophy 106 (7):404-417 (2009)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI jphil2009106721
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John P. Burgess (2005). Fixing Frege. Princeton University Press.
Barbara Fultner (2005). Referentiality in Frege and Heidegger. Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):37-52.
Brian Epstein (2008). The Realpolitik of Reference. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):1–20.
Charles Travis (2008). To Represent as So. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge
Friedel Weinert (1991). Introducing Events, Successful Reference and Reference-Fixing. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (1):155-167.
Mark Textor (2009). Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
Ivan Welty (2011). Frege on Indirect Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

21 ( #137,372 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #147,227 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.