Franklin, Holmes, and the epistemology of computer simulation

Allan Franklin has identified a number of strategies that scientists use to build confidence in experimental results. This paper shows that Franklin's strategies have direct analogues in the context of computer simulation and then suggests that one of his strategies—the so-called 'Sherlock Holmes' strategy—deserves a privileged place within the epistemologies of experiment and simulation. In particular, it is argued that while the successful application of even several of Franklin's other strategies (or their analogues in simulation) may not be sufficient for justified belief in results, the successful application of a slightly elaborated version of the Sherlock Holmes strategy is sufficient.
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DOI 10.1080/02698590802496722
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References found in this work BETA
Deborah G. Mayo (2001). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Peter Galison (1990). How Experiments End. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):103-106.

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