Gödel and philosophical idealism

Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2):166-192 (2010)
Abstract
Kurt Gödel made many affirmations of robust realism but also showed serious engagement with the idealist tradition, especially with Leibniz, Kant, and Husserl. The root of this apparently paradoxical attitude is his conviction of the power of reason. The paper explores the question of how Gödel read Kant. His argument that relativity theory supports the idea of the ideality of time is discussed critically, in particular attempting to explain the assertion that science can go beyond the appearances and ‘approach the things’. Leibniz and post-Kantian idealism are discussed more briefly, the latter as documented in the correspondence with Gotthard Günther
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References found in this work BETA
Karl Ameriks (1985). Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):1-35.
A. P. Hazen (1998). On Gödel's Ontological Proof. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):361 – 377.
Hilary Putnam (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):240-247.

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