Innumerate ethics
Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (4):285-301 (1978)
| Abstract | Suppose that we can help either one person or many others. Is it a reason t0 help the many that We should thus be helping more people? John Taurek thinks not. We may learn from his arguments. | |||||||||
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