Is everything a world?

Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181 (2007)
Abstract
This paper discusses “inclusionism” in the context of David Lewis’s modal realism (and in the context of parasitic accounts of modality such as John Divers’s agnosticism about possible worlds). This is the doctrine that everything is a world. I argue that this doctrine would be beneficial to Divers-style agnosticism; that it suggests a reconfiguration of the concept of actuality in modal realism; and finally that it suffers from an as-yet unsolved difficulty, the problem of the unmarried husbands. This problem also shows that Stephen Yablo’s analysis of “intrinsic” is inadequate.
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (2001). Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-355.

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