Intrinsic value and intrinsic properties

Abstract

It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction between intrinsic and nonintrinsic value; the latter is between value as-an-end and instrumental value.

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2009-01-28

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Author's Profile

Josh Parsons
PhD: Australian National University; Last affiliation: University of Otago

Citations of this work

An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value.Scott Hill - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.

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References found in this work

Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):97--114.

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