Intrinsic value and intrinsic properties

It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction between intrinsic and nonintrinsic value; the latter is between value as-an-end and instrumental value.
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Scott Hill (2011). An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.

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