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Ratio 16 (4):368–390 (2003)
sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to, some other people's well-being or moral claims.' Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to this sense of 'reasonable', his formula is empty. On this objection, whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle which no one could reasonably reject, since anyone who rejected this principle would be giving too little weight to people's moral claims not to be treated in this way. Since everyone could claim that the principles which they accept could not be reasonably rejected, Scanlon's Formula would make no difference to our moral thinking. That is not so. If we reject the principles that disallow certain acts, we are denying that such acts are wrong. This denial would be unreasonable if it would give too little weight to some other people's moral claims. So Scanlon's Formula implies that..
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Iwao Hirose (2013). Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 25 (2):182-205.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2016). Derek Parfit's Contributions to Philosophy. Theoria 82 (2):104-109.
Hon-Lam Li (2015). Contractualism and Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (2):177-209.
Michael Otsuka (2006). Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):109–135.
Barbara H. Fried (2012). Can Contractualism Save Us From Aggregation? Journal of Ethics 16 (1):39-66.
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