Language and knowledge in Spinoza

Inquiry 12 (1-4):15 – 40 (1969)
Abstract
This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument of the Ethics is conducted on the level of the ?second kind of knowledge?, reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge
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