The Monist 83 (3):399-418 (2000)
|Abstract||The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is wholly present at more than one time. For short, it persists by enduring. Four-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by having a temporal part at that time, and it persists if it has distinct temporal parts at more than one time. For short, it persists by perduring (Jackson 1998, p. 138). In the light of these comments, some readers will perhaps ﬁnd the question that forms the title of this paper a little puzzling. They may have learned to use the terms ‘fourdimensionalism’ ‘perdurantism’ and ‘belief in temporal parts’ interchangeably; or perhaps even to deﬁne one in terms of the other. Such a usage, however, is inapposite. We might imagine a Flatland-like world of two spatial dimensions and one temporal, whose philosophers are divided between a theory of persistence on which they persist by having temporal parts, and a theory on which they persist by being wholly located in each of several times. This is just the same issue we face, but at least the label ‘four-dimensionalism’ seems inapposite: the four-dimensionalist Flatlanders believe in only three dimensions!|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Theodore Sider (1997). Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738-752.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738–752.
Ryan Wasserman, Recombination, Causal Constraints and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?
Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
Yuri Balashov (2000). Relativity and Persistence. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):562.
Mark Moyer (2009). Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.
Theodore Sider (1996). All the World's a Stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
Berit Brogaard (2000). Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. The Monist 83 (3):341-356.
Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen (2010). Persistence of Simple Substances. Metaphysica 11 (2):119-135.
Ned Markosian (1994). The 3d/4d Controversy and Non-Present Objects. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):243-249.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads55 ( #18,769 of 556,909 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #11,176 of 556,909 )
How can I increase my downloads?