Mathematical Thought and its Objects

Cambridge University Press (2007)
Abstract
In Mathematical Thought and Its Objects, Charles Parsons examines the notion of object, with the aim to navigate between nominalism, denying that distinctively mathematical objects exist, and forms of Platonism that postulate a transcendent realm of such objects. He introduces the central mathematical notion of structure and defends a version of the structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which their existence is relative to a structure and they have no more of a “nature” than that confers on them
Keywords Mathematics Philosophy  Object (Philosophy  Logic
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Reprint years 2008, 2009
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Call number QA8.4.P366 2008
ISBN(s) 0521452791   9780521452793   9780521119115
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John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.

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