Mathematical Thought and its Objects
Cambridge University Press (2008)
| Abstract | In Mathematical Thought and Its Objects, Charles Parsons examines the notion of object, with the aim to navigate between nominalism, denying that distinctively mathematical objects exist, and forms of Platonism that postulate a transcendent realm of such objects. He introduces the central mathematical notion of structure and defends a version of the structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which their existence is relative to a structure and they have no more of a “nature” than that confers on them | |||||||||
| Keywords | Mathematics Philosophy Object (Philosophy Logic | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $81.00 new (29% off) $90.56 direct from Amazon (21% off) Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | QA8.4.P366 2008 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 0521452791 9780521452793 | |||||||||
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Andrej Krause (2008). Über Das Verhältnis Allgemeiner Und Individueller Materieller Und Mathematischer Gegenstände Nach Thomas Von Aquin. Vivarium 46 (2):155-174.
Jessica Carter (2004). Ontology and Mathematical Practice. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (3):244-267.
Jill North (2009). The “Structure” of Physics. Journal of Philosophy 106 (2):57-88.
Phil Corkum (2012). Aristotle on Mathematical Truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1057-1076.
Øystein Linnebo (2009). Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Charles Parsons (2004). Structuralism and Metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):56--77.
Mark Balaguer, Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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