Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602 (2006)
|Abstract||I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in S223' and 'Theatetus is not flying') they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to 'There are no unicorns'. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gunnar Björnsson, If You Believe in Positive Facts, You Should Believe in Negative Facts. Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
Boris Kukso (2006). The Reality of Absences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):21 – 37.
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2011). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Stephen Mumford (2007). Negative Truth and Falsehood. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45-71.
Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Julian Dodd (2007). Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles. Synthese 156 (2):383-401.
Michael Veber (2008). How to Derive a 'Not' From an 'Is': A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths. Metaphysica 9 (1):79-91.
Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #18,771 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,093 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?