Opacity, coreference, and pronouns

Synthese 21 (3-4):359 - 385 (1970)
Abstract
The problem discussed here is to find a basis for a uniform treatment of the relation between pronouns and their antecedents, taking into account both linguists' and philosophers' approaches. The two main candidates would appear to be the linguists' notion of coreference and the philosophers' notion of pronouns as variables. The notion of coreference can be extended to many but not all cases where the antecedent is non-referential. The pronouns-as-variables approach appears to come closer to full generality, but there are some examples of pronouns of laziness which appear to resist either of the two approaches.
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References found in this work BETA
Emmon Bach (1970). Problominalization. Linguistic Inquiry 1:121--122.
P. T. Geach (1967). Intentional Identity. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. M. Bell (1973). What is Referential Opacity? Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):155 - 180.
Dorothy Grover (1981). Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 40 (1):225-252.

View all 8 citations

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