Opacity, coreference, and pronouns

Synthese 21 (3-4):359 - 385 (1970)
The problem discussed here is to find a basis for a uniform treatment of the relation between pronouns and their antecedents, taking into account both linguists' and philosophers' approaches. The two main candidates would appear to be the linguists' notion of coreference and the philosophers' notion of pronouns as variables. The notion of coreference can be extended to many but not all cases where the antecedent is non-referential. The pronouns-as-variables approach appears to come closer to full generality, but there are some examples of pronouns of laziness which appear to resist either of the two approaches.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00484805
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References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1962/1968). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dorothy Grover (1981). Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 40 (1):225-252.
Dorothy L. Grover (1981). Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophia 10 (3-4):225-252.

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