Personal identity and rationality

Synthese 53 (2):227-241 (1982)
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Abstract

There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.

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Derek Parfit
Last affiliation: Oxford University

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