Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 53 (2):227-241 (1982)
|Abstract||There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Personal Identity Prudence Rationality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ned Markosian (2010). Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
Marya Schechtman (2010). Memory and Identity. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
Basil Smith (2006). John Locke, Personal Identity and Memento. In Mark T. Conard (ed.), The Philosophy of Neo-Noir. University of Kentucky Press.
Gereon Kopf (2002). Temporality and Personal Identity in the Thought of Nishida Kitaro. Philosophy East and West 52 (2):224-245.
Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
Timothy Chappell (1998). Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.
Amy Kind (2004). The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
Tove Finnestad (2001). Trivial Personal Differences. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):41-55.
Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.
Eugene O. Mills (1993). Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity. Mind 102 (405):37-51.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads272 ( #810 of 739,427 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #12,331 of 739,427 )
How can I increase my downloads?