Philosophical responses to underdetermination in science

What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
Keywords Underdetermination  Scientific Realism  Approximate Truth  Empirical Adequacy
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DOI 10.2307/40390675
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Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.

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