Person: Theories And Perceptions

The Hague: M. Nijhoff (1973)
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Abstract

This volume grew out of a dissatisfaction with some issues that seem to be rooted in the Empiricist tradition. At least since Locke, that which is perceived has enjoyed a major share in any systematic account of what we claim to know. A main purpose of this study therefore is first to distinguish, and subsequently to relate, what can be perceived and what can be under stood. To this end, the account of persons and personal identity begins with a description of selected types of sense perceptions. While writing a good part of the discussion on vision, I had the advantage of questioning Dr. P. B. Loder about the properties of light. She not only clarified some issues, but prevented several errors from creeping into the text, a result for which I am very grateful. I should like also to express my appreciation to Mrs. G. K. Stamm-Okkinga, who provided hospitality and a friendly interest from the beginning of this study. Finally I wish to thank Miss I. Ris and Mr. W. de Regt for their careful and resourceful preparation of the typescript.

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