Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130 (1997)
|Abstract||When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to me, did not motivate me. Though we can have normative reasons without being motivated, and vice versa, such reasons are closely related to our motivation. There are, however, very different views about what this relation is. This disagreement raises wider questions about what normative reasons are, and about which reasons there are. After sketching some of these views, I shall discuss some arguments by Williams, and then say where, in my opinion, the truth lies. [...] I [will] suggest why, as I believe, we should be non-reductive normative realists, and should regard all reasons as external.|
|Keywords||humean theory of motivation Bernard Williams Internalism and externalism about reasons|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alan Thomas (2009). Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality. Utilitas 14 (02):135-.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Jonathan Dancy (1995). Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1-18.
William J. FitzPatrick (2004). Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism. Mind 113 (450):285-318.
Dean Lubin (2009). External Reasons. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):273-291.
Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder, Reasons for Action: Internal Vs. External. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stephen Finlay (2006). The Reasons That Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
Mark Schroeder (2007). The Humean Theory of Reasons. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads307 ( #565 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)25 ( #5,053 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?