David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1984)
Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions that most of us will find very disturbing.
|Keywords||Ethics Rationalism Self|
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|Call number||BJ1012.P39 1984|
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Citations of this work BETA
Tomasz Żuradzki (2015). Time-Biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research About Time Preferences. In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press 149-187.
Toby Handfield (2015). Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3).
Richard Yetter Chappell (2015). Value Receptacles. Noûs 49 (2):322-332.
Jesse R. Steinberg (2005). Response to Fritz Allhoff, "Telomeres and the Ethics of Human Cloning". American Journal of Bioethics 5 (1):W27-W28.
Guy Kahane (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
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