Ryle's theory of action in the concept of mind

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3):379-392 (1980)
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10.2307/2106400

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Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.

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