David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Topoi 16 (1):41-63 (1997)
This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there were two Medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. I suggest that early work by Sherwood and others was a study of quantifiers: their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that can be made from quantified terms. Later, in the hands of Burley and others, it changed into a study of something else, a study of what I call global quantificational effect. For example, although the quantifier in ¬xPx is universal, it can be seen globally as having an existential effect; this is because the formula containing it is equivalent to x¬Px. The notion of global effect can be explained in terms of the modern theory of normal forms. I suggest that early authors were studying quantifiers, and the terminology of the theory of personal supposition is a classification of kinds of quantifiers. In this theory, to say that a term has distributive supposition is to say, roughly, that it is quantified by a universal quantifying sign. Later authors turned this into a theory of global quantificational effect. In the later theory, to say that a term has distributive supposition is to say that the overall effect is as if the term were universally quantified with a quantifier taking (relatively) wide scope. The difference between these two approaches is illustrated by the fact that the term man is classified as having distributive ("universal") supposition in Not every man is running in the earlier theory, whereas in the later theory that term does not have distributive supposition; it has determinate ("existential") supposition. In the paper I explain these options, and I argue from several texts that the earlier and later medieval theories actually worked like this. In an appendix I make further efforts to clarify the obscure early accounts, as well as the nineteenth century "doctrine of distribution". The last section of the paper discusses the "purpose(s)" of supposition theory.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
E. P. Bos (2007). Richard Billingham's Speculum Puerorum, Some Medieval Commentaries and Aristotle. Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):360-373.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2007). Theory of Supposition Vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham. Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):343-359.
Mikko Yrjönsuuri (1997). Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language. Topoi 16 (1):15-25.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2008). An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (3):pp. 365-393.
Terence Parsons (1994). Anaphoric Pronouns in Very Late Medieval Supposition Theory. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (5):429 - 445.
Gareth B. Matthews (1997). Two Theories of Supposition? Topoi 16 (1):35-40.
Paul Vincent Spade (1997). Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms. Topoi 16 (1):7-13.
Terence Parsons (2013). Missing Modes of Supposition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):1-24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #176,689 of 1,099,861 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #303,846 of 1,099,861 )
How can I increase my downloads?