The many primitives of mereology
|Abstract||This seems to me to be a metaphysically significant feature of CEM. If CEM is correct — if all its theorems are true, then metaphysicians have a choice to make in how we understand the mereological nature of the world. We may think of the mereological relation either as a relation of part to whole, or as a relation of overlap; for if we give a metaphysical theory about one, we thereby give a metaphysical theory about the other. We may choose which we think of as more metaphysically fundamental, for the they are interdefinable. However, if CEM is not correct, then perhaps we do not have this choice. Perhaps part-whole cannot be defined in terms of overlap; in which case we must choose part-whole as the metaphysical fundamental mereological relation (if any relation is)|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Gabriel Uzquiano (forthcoming). Mereology and Modality. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press.
Joshua T. Spencer (2006). Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Philo 9 (1):62-72.
Maureen Donnelly (2011). Using Mereological Principles to Support Metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):225-246.
L. A. Paul (forthcoming). Mereological Bundle Theory. In Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt & Guido Imaguire (eds.), Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag.
Paul Hovda (2009). What Is Classical Mereology? Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1):55 - 82.
Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Parts of Propositions. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Mormann (2013). Heyting Mereology as a Framework for Spatial Reasoning. Axiomathes 23 (1):137- 164.
Sean Walsh (2012). Modal Mereology and Modal Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):1-20.
Kristie Miller (2005). What is Metaphysical Equivalence? Philosophical Papers 34 (1):45-74.
Paul Hovda (2013). Tensed Mereology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):241-283.
Javier Kalhat (2011). Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility? Acta Analytica 26 (2):115-133.
Berit Brogaard (2004). Species as Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):223-242.
Added to index2012-03-30
Total downloads32 ( #38,026 of 551,054 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,753 of 551,054 )
How can I increase my downloads?