David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368 (2006)
To study Earth’s climate, scientists now use a variety of computer simulation models. These models disagree in some of their assumptions about the climate system, yet they are used together as complementary resources for investigating future climatic change. This paper examines and defends this use of incompatible models. I argue that climate model pluralism results both from uncertainty concerning how to best represent the climate system and from difficulties faced in evaluating the relative merits of complex models. I describe how incompatible climate models are used together in ‘multi-model ensembles’ and explain why this practice is reasonable, given scientists’ inability to identify a ‘best’ model for predicting future climate. Finally, I characterize climate model pluralism as involving both an ontic competitive pluralism and a pragmatic integrative pluralism.
|Keywords||climate change computer simulation models pluralism uncertainty|
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References found in this work BETA
Sandra D. Mitchell (2002). Integrative Pluralism. Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):55-70.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Hochstein (2015). Giving Up on Convergence and Autonomy: Why the Theories of Psychology and Neuroscience Are Codependent as Well as Irreconcilable. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:1-19.
Wendy S. Parker (2011). When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):579-600.
Wendy Parker (2014). Values and Uncertainties in Climate Prediction, Revisited. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:24-30.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd (2015). Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
Eric Winsberg (2009). Computer Simulation and the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):835-845.
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